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Abstract
We consider repeated games in which the player, instead of observing the action chosen
by the opponent in each game round, receives a feedback generated by the combined choice
of the two players. We study Hannan consistent players for this games; that is, randomized
playing strategies whose per-round regret vanishes with probability one as the number n of
game rounds goes to inﬁnity. We prove a general lower bound of 
(n 1=3) on the conver-
gence rate of the regret, and exhibit a speciﬁc strategy that attains this rate on any game for
which a Hannan consistent player exists.
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11 A motivating example
A simple yet nontrivial example of partial monitoring is the following dynamic pricing problem.
A vendor sells a product to a sequence of customers whom he attends one by one. To each
customer, the seller offers the product at a price he selects, say, from the interval [0;1]. The cus-
tomer then decides to buy the product or not. No bargaining is possible and no other information
is exchanged between buyer and seller. The goal of the seller is to achieve an income almost as
large as if he knew the maximal price each customer is willing to pay for the product. Thus, if
the price offered to the t-th customer is pt and the highest price this customer is willing to pay is
yt 2 [0;1], then the loss of the seller is yt   pt if the product is sold and (say) a constant c > 0 if
the product is not sold. Formally, the loss of the vendor at time t is
`(pt;yt) = (yt   pt)Iptyt + cIpt>yt
where c 2 [0;1]. In another version of the problem the constant c may be replaced by yt. In
either case, if the seller knew in advance the empirical distribution of the yt’s then he could set
a constant price q 2 [0;1] which minimizes his overall loss. A natural question is whether there
exists a randomized strategy for the seller such that his average regret
1
n
n X
t=1
`(pt;yt)   min
q2[0;1]
1
n
n X
t=1
`(q;yt)
is guaranteed to converge to zero as n ! 1 regardless of the sequence y1;y2;::: of prices. The
difﬁculty in this problem is that the only information the seller (i.e., the forecaster) has access to
is whether pt > yt but neither yt nor `(pt;yt) are revealed. One of the main results of this paper
describes a simple strategy such that the average regret deﬁned above is of the order of n  1=5.
We treat such limited-feedback (or partial monitoring) prediction problems in a more general
framework which we describe next. The dynamic pricing problem described above, which is
a special case of this more general framework, has been also investigated by Kleinberg and
Leighton[27] in a simpler settingwhere the reward of the seller is deﬁned as (p t;yt) = pt Iptyt.
Note that, by using the feedback information (i.e., whether the customer bought the product or
not), here the seller can compute the value of (pt;yt). Therefore, their game reduces to an
instance of the multi-armed bandit game (see Example 1 below) with a continuous action space.
2 Main deﬁnitions
We adopt a learning-theoretic viewpoint and describe partial monitoring as a repeated prediction
game between a forecaster (the player) and the environment (the opponent). In the same spirit,
we call outcomes the actions taken by the environment. At each round t = 1;2::: of the game,
the forecaster chooses an action It from the set f1;:::;Ng, and the environment chooses an
action yt from the set f1;:::;Mg. The losses of the forecaster are summarized in the loss
matrix L = [`(i;j)]NM. (This matrix is assumed to be known by the forecaster.) If, at time
t, the forecaster chooses an action It 2 f1;:::;Ng and the outcome is yt 2 f1;:::;Mg, then
2PREDICTION WITH PARTIAL MONITORING
Parameters: number of actions N, number of outcomes M, loss function `, feedback func-
tion h.
For each round t = 1;2:::,
(1) the environment chooses the next outcome yt 2 f1;:::;Mg without revealing it;
(2) the forecaster chooses a probability distribution pt over the set of N actions and draws
an action It 2 f1;:::;Ng according to this distribution;
(3) the forecaster incurs loss `(It;yt) and each action i incurs loss `(i;yt), where none of
these values is revealed to the forecaster;
(4) the feedback h(It;yt) is revealed to the forecaster.
the forecaster’s suffers loss `(It;yt). However, instead of the outcome yt, the forecaster only
observes the feedback h(It;yt), where h is a known feedback function that assigns, to each
action/outcome pair in f1;:::;Ng  f1;:::;Mg an element of a ﬁnite set S = fs 1;:::;smg of
signals. The values of h are collected in a feedback matrix H = [h(i;j)]NM.
Note that we do not make any restrictive assumption on the power of the opponent. The
environment may choose action yt at time t by considering the whole past, that is, the whole
sequence of action/outcomepairs (Is;ys), s = 1;:::;t 1. Withoutlossof generality, we assume
that the opponent uses a deterministic strategy, so that the value of yt is ﬁxed by the sequence
(I1;:::;It 1). In comparison, the forecaster has access to signiﬁcantly less information, since
he only knows the sequence of past feedbacks, (h(I1;y1);:::;h(It 1;yt 1)).
We note here that some authors consider a more general setup in which the feedback may
be random. For the sake of clarity we treat the simpler model described above and return to the
more general case in Section 7.
It is an interesting and complex problem to investigate the possibilities of a predictor only
supplied with the limited information of the feedback. In this paper we focus on the average
regret
1
n
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min
i=1;:::;N
1
n
n X
t=1
`(i;yt) ;
that is, the difference between the average (per-round) loss of the forecaster and the average
(per-round) loss of the best action. Forecasting strategies guaranteeing that the average regret
converges to zero almost surely for all possible strategies of the environment are called Hannan
consistent after James Hannan, who ﬁrst proved the existence of a Hannan consistent strategy
in the full information case [20] when h(i;j) = j for all i;j (i.e., when the true outcome yt
is revealed to the forecaster after taking an action). The full information case has been studied
extensively in the theory of repeated games, and in the ﬁelds of learning theory and information
3theory. A few key references and surveys include Blackwell [6], Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, Haus-
sler, Helmbold, Schapire, and Warmuth [8], Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [9], Feder, Merhav, and
Gutman [13], Foster and Vohra [17], Hart and Mas-Colell [22], Littlestone and Warmuth [28],
Merhav and Feder [31], and Vovk [37, 36].
A natural question one may ask is under what conditions on the loss and feedback matrices it
is possible to achieve Hannan consistency; that is, to guarantee that, asymptotically, the cumula-
tive loss of the forecaster is not larger than that of the best constant action with probability one.
Naturally, this depends on the relationship between the loss and feedback functions. An initial
answer to this question has been provided by the work of Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [33].
However, since they are only concerned with expected performance, their results do not imply
Hannan consistency. In addition, their bounds have suboptimal rates of convergence. Below,
we extend those results by showing a forecaster that achieves Hannan consistency with optimal
convergence rates.
Note that the forecaster is free to encode the values h(i;j) of the feedback function by real
numbers. The only restriction is that if h(i;j) = h(i;j0) then the corresponding real numbers
should also coincide. To avoid ambiguities by trivial rescaling, we assume that jh(i;j)j  1
for all pairs (i;j). Thus, in the sequel we assume that H = [h(i;j)]NM is a matrix of real
numbers between  1 and 1 and keep in mind that the forecaster may replace this matrix by
H = [i(h(i;j))]NM for arbitrary functions i : [ 1;1] ! [ 1;1], i = 1;:::;N. Note that
the set S of signals may be chosen such that it has m  M elements, though after numerical
encoding the matrix may have as many as MN distinct elements.
The problem of partial monitoring was considered by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir [32], Rus-
tichini [34], Piccolboni, and Schindelhauer [33], and Mannor and Shimkin [29]. The forecaster
strategy studied in Section 3 is ﬁrst introduced in [33], where its expected regret is shown to
have a sub-linear growth. Rustichini [34] and Mannor and Shimkin [29] consider a more gen-
eral setup in which the feedback is not necessarily a deterministic function of the pair outcome
and forecaster’s action, but it may be random with a distribution indexed by this pair. Based on
Blackwell’s approachability theorem, Rustichini [34] establishes a general existence result for
strategies with asymptotically optimal performance in this more general framework. In this pa-
per we answer Rustichini’s question about the fastest achievable rate of convergence in the case
when Hannan consistent strategies exist. Mannor and Shimkin also consider cases when Hannan
consistency may not be achieved, give a partial solution, and point out important difﬁculties in
such cases.
Before introducing a general prediction strategy and sufﬁcient conditions for its Hannan con-
sistency, we describe a few concrete examples of partial monitoring problems.
Example 1 (MULTI-ARMED BANDIT PROBLEM.) A well-studied special case of the partial
monitoring prediction problem is the so-called multi-armed bandit problem. Here the forecaster,
after taking an action, is able to measure his loss (or reward) but does not have access to what
would have happened had he chosen another possible action. Here H = L, that is, the feedback
received by the forecaster is just his own loss. This problem has been widely studied both in a
stochastic and in a worst-case setting. The worst-case or adversarial setting considered in this
paper was ﬁrst investigated by Ba˜ nos [5] (see also Megiddo [30]). Hannan consistent strategies
4were constructed by Foster and Vohra [16], Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, and Schapire [2], and
Hart and Mas Colell [21, 23] (see also Fudenberg and Levine [19]). Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund,
and Schapire [2] (see also Auer [1]) deﬁne a strategy that guarantees a rate of convergence of the
order O(
p
N log(nN)=n) for the regret, which is optimal up to the logarithmic factor.
Example 2 (DYNAMIC PRICING.) Consider the dynamic pricing problem described in the in-
troduction of the section under the additional restriction that all prices take their values from
the ﬁnite set f0;1=N;:::;(N   1)=Ng where N is a positive integer (see Example 6 for a
non-discretized version). Clearly, if N is sufﬁciently large, this discrete version approximates
arbitrarily the original problem. Now one may take M = N and the loss matrix is
L = [`(i;j)]NN where `(i;j) =
j   i
N
Iij + cIi>j :
The information the forecaster (i.e., the vendor) receives is simply whether the predicted value
It is greater than the outcome yt or not. Thus, the entries of the feedback matrix H may be taken
to be h(i;j) = Ii>j or, after an appropriate re-encoding,
h(i;j) = aIij + bIi>j i;j = 1;:::;N
where a and b are constants chosen by the forecaster satisfying a;b 2 [ 1;1].
Example 3 (APPLE TASTING.) This problem was considered by Helmbold, Littlestone, and
Long [25] in a somewhat more restrictive setting. In this example N = M = 2 and the loss and
feedback matrices are given by
L =

0 1
1 0

and H =

a a
b c

:
Thus, theforecaster onlyreceivesfeedback abouttheoutcomeyt whenhe choosestheﬁrst action.
(Imagine that apples are to be classiﬁed as “good for sale” or “rotten”. An apple classiﬁed as
“rotten” may be opened to check whether its classiﬁcation was correct. On the other hand, since
apples that have been checked can not be put on sale, an apple classiﬁed “good for sale” is never
checked.)
Example 4 (LABEL-EFFICIENT PREDICTION.) In label-efﬁcient prediction (see Helmbold and
Panizza [24] and also Cesa-Bianchi, Lugosi, and Stoltz [11]) the forecaster, after choosing its
prediction for round t, decides whether to query the outcome yt, which he can only do for a
limited number of times. In [11] matching upper and lower bounds are given for the regret in
terms of the number of available labels, total number of rounds, and number of actions. A variant
of the label-efﬁcient prediction problem may also be cast as a partial monitoring problem. Let
N = 3, M = 2, and consider loss and feedback matrices of the form
L =
2
4
1 1
0 1
1 0
3
5 and H =
2
4
a b
c c
c c
3
5 :
5In this example the only times useful feedback is received are when the ﬁrst action is played but
in this case a maximal loss is incurred regardless of the outcome. Thus, just like in the problem
of label-efﬁcient prediction, playing the “informative” action has to be limited, otherwise there
is no hope for Hannan consistency.
3 General upper bounds on the regret
The purpose of this section is to derive general upper bounds for the rate of convergence of the
regret achievable under partial monitoring. This will be done by analyzing a forecasting strat-
egy inspired by Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [33]. This strategy is based on the exponentially
weighted average forecaster, a thoroughly studied predictor in the full information case, see,
for example, Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Gentile [3], Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, Haussler, Helmbold,
Schapire, and Warmuth [8], Littlestone and Warmuth [28], Vovk [37, 36]. In the special case
of the multi-armed bandit problem, the forecaster reduces to the strategy of Auer, Cesa-Bianchi,
Freund, and Schapire [2] (see also Hart and Mas-Colell [23] for a closely related method).
The crucial assumption under which the strategy is deﬁned is that there exists an N  N
matrix K = [k(i;j)]NN such that
L = KH ;
that is,
H and

H
L

have the same rank. In other words we may write, for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng and j 2 f1;:::;Mg,
`(i;j) =
N X
l=1
k(i;l)h(l;j) :
In this case one may deﬁne the estimated lossese ` by
e `(i;yt) =
k(i;It)h(It;yt)
pIt;t
; i = 1;:::;N : (1)
We denote the cumulative estimated losses at round t and for action i by e Li;t =
Pt
s=1 e `(i;yt).
Consider the forecaster deﬁned in Figure 1. Roughly speaking, the two terms in the expres-
sion of pi;t correspond to “exploitation” and “exploration”. The ﬁrst term assigns exponentially
decreasing weights to the actions depending on their estimated cumulative losses, while the sec-
ond term ensures sufﬁcient exploration to guarantee accurate estimates of the losses.
A key property of the loss estimates is their unbiasedness in the following sense. Denoting
by Et the conditional expectation given I1;:::;It 1 (i.e., the expectation with respect to the
distribution pt of the random variable It), observe that this conditioning ﬁxes the value of y t, and
6Parameters: matrix of losses L, feedback matrix H, matrix K such that L = KH
Initialization: e L1;0 =  = e LN;0 = 0.
For each round t = 1;2;:::
(1) let t = (k) 2=3((lnN)=N)2=3t 2=3 and t = (k)2=3N2=3(lnN)1=3t 1=3;
(2) choose an action It from the set of actions f1;:::;Ng at random, according to the
distribution pt deﬁned by
pi;t = (1   t)
e te Li;t 1
PN
k=1 e te Lk;t 1
+
t
N
;
(3) let e Li;t = e Li;t 1 + e `(i;yt) for all i = 1;:::;N.
Figure 1: The randomized forecaster for prediction under partial monitoring.
thus,
Ete `(i;yt) =
N X
k=1
k(i;k)h(k;yt)
pk;t
pk;t
=
N X
k=1
k(i;k)h(k;yt) = `(i;yt) ; i = 1;:::;N ;
and therefore e `(i;yt) is an unbiased estimate of the loss `(i;yt).
The main performance bound of this section is summarized in the next theorem. Note that
the average regret
1
n
 
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min
i=1;:::;N
n X
t=1
`(i;yt)
!
decreases to zero at a rate n 1=3. This is signiﬁcantly slower than the best rate n  1=2 obtained
in the “full information” case. In the next section we show that this rate cannot be improved
in general. Thus, the price paid for having access only to some feedback except for the actual
outcomes is the deterioration in the rate of convergence. However, Hannan consistency is still
achievable whenever the conditions of the theorem are satisﬁed.
Theorem 1 Consider any partial monitoring problem such that the loss and feedback matrices
satisfy L = KH for some N  N matrix K with k = maxf1; maxi;j jk(i;j)jg, and consider
the forecaster of Figure 1. Let  2 (0;1). Then, for all strategies of the opponent, for all n, with
7probability at least 1   ,
1
n
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min
i=1;:::;N
1
n
n X
t=1
`(i;yt)
 5

(kN)2 lnN
n
1=3  
1 +
r
3
2
ln((N + 4)=)
lnN
!
+
r
1
2n
ln
N + 4

+ 5(k
N)
4=3n
 2=3(lnN)
 1=3 ln
N + 4

+
kN
n
ln
N + 4

:
The main term in the performance bound has the order of magnitude n 1=3(kN)2=3(lnN)1=3.
Observe that this theorem directly implies Hannan consistency, by a simple application of the
Borel-Cantelli lemma.
Proof. The starting point of the proof of the theorem is an application of Theorem 5 (shown in
the Appendix to the estimated losses). Since e `i;t lies between 0 and Bt = kN=t, the proposed
values of t and t imply that tBt 6 1 if and only if t > (lnN)=(Nk), that is, for all t > 1.
Therefore, deﬁning for t = 1;:::;n, the probability vectore pt by its components
e pi;t =
e te Li;t 1
PN
k=1 e te Lk;t 1
i = 1;:::;N ;
we may apply Theorem 5 to obtain
n X
t=1
N X
i=1
e pi;te `(i;yt)   min
j=1;:::;N
e Lj;n 6
2lnN
n+1
+
n X
t=1
t
N X
i=1
e pi;te `(i;yt)
2 :
Since pi;t = (1   t)e pi;t + t=N, the inequality above yields, after some simple bounding,
n X
t=1
N X
i=1
pi;te `(i;yt)  min
j=1;:::;N
e Lj;n 6
2lnN
n+1
+
n X
t=1
t
N X
i=1
e pi;te `(i;yt)
2 +
n X
t=1
t
N X
i=1
1
N
e `(i;yt) : (2)
Introduce the notation
b Ln =
n X
t=1
`(It;yt) and Lj;n =
n X
t=1
`(j;yt); j = 1;:::;N :
Next we show that, with an overwhelming probability, the right-hand side of the inequality (2) is
less than something of the order n2=3, and that the left-hand side is close to the actual regret
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min
j=1;:::;N
Lj;n :
Our main tool is Bernstein’s inequality for martingales, see Lemma 7 in the Appendix. This
inequality implies the following four lemmas, whose proofs are similar, so we omit some of
them.
8Lemma 1 With probability at least 1   =(N + 4),
n X
t=1
N X
i=1
pi;t`(i;yt) 6
n X
t=1
N X
i=1
pi;te `(i;yt)+
v u u
t2(kN)2
 
n X
t=1
1
t
!
ln
N + 4

+
p
2
3
kN
n
ln
N + 4

:
Proof. Deﬁne Z t =  
PN
i=1 pi;te `(i;yt) so that Et[Zt] =  
PN
i=1 pi;t`(i;yt), and consider Xt =
Zt   Et[Zt]. We note that
Et[X
2
t ] 6 Et[Z
2
t ] =
X
i;j
pi;tpj;tEt
h
e `(i;yt)e `(j;yt)
i
=
X
i;j
pi;tpj;t
N X
k=1
pk;t
k(i;k)k(j;k)h(k;yt)2
p2
k;t
6
(kN)2
t
;
and therefore,
Vn =
n X
t=1
Et[X
2
t ] 6 (k
N)
2
n X
t=1
1
t
:
On the other hand, jXtj is bounded by K = (kN)=n. Bernstein’s inequality (see Lemma 7)
thus concludes the proof.
Lemma 2 For each ﬁxed j, with probability at least 1   =(N + 4),
e Lj;n 6 Lj;n + +
v u
u
t2(kN)2
 
n X
t=1
1
t
!
ln
N + 4

+
p
2
3n
ln
N + 4

:
Lemma 3 With probability at least 1   =(N + 4),
n X
t=1
t
N X
i=1
e pi;te `(i;yt)
2 6
n X
t=1
t
(kN)2
t
+
v u u
t2(kN)4
 
n X
t=1
2
t
3
t
!
ln
N + 4

+
p
2
3
ln
N + 4

:
Proof. Let Zt = t
PN
i=1 e pi;te `(i;yt)2, and Xt = Zt   Et[Zt]. All jXtj are bounded by
K = max
t=1;:::;n
t
(kN)2
2
t
= 1 :
On the other hand,
Vn =
n X
t=1
Et[X
2
t ] 6 (k
N)
4
n X
t=1
2
t
3
t
:
Lemma 7 now concludes the proof, together with the inequality
Et[Zt] 6 t
(kN)2
t
:
9Lemma 4 With probability at least 1   =(N + 4),
n X
t=1
t
N X
i=1
1
N
e `(i;yt) 6
n X
t=1
t +
v u
u
t2(kN)2
 
n X
t=1
t
!
ln
N + 4

+
p
2kN
3
ln
N + 4

:
The next lemma is an easy consequence of the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality for sums of
bounded martingale differences (see Hoeffding [26], Azuma [4]).
Lemma 5 With probability at least 1   =(N + 3),
n X
t=1
`(It;yt) 6
n X
t=1
N X
i=1
pi;t`(i;yt) +
r
n
2
ln
N + 4

:
The proof of the main result follows now from a combination of Lemmas 1 to 5 with (2) (where
Lemma 2 is applied N times). Usinga union-of-eventsbound, we see that, with probability1 ,
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min
j=1;:::;N
Lj;n
6
2lnN
n+1
+ 2
0
@
v u
u
t2(kN)2
 
n X
t=1
1
t
!
ln
N + 4

+
p
2
3
kN
n
ln
N + 4

1
A
+
n X
t=1
t
(kN)2
t
+
v u
u
t2(kN)4
 
n X
t=1
2
t
3
t
!
ln
N + 4

+
p
2
3
ln
N + 4

+
n X
t=1
t +
v u
u
t2(kN)2
 
n X
t=1
t
!
ln
N + 4

+
p
2kN
3
ln
N + 4

+
r
n
2
ln
N + 4

:
Substituting the proposed values of t and t, and using that for  1 <  6 0
n X
t=1
t
 6
1
 + 1
n
+1 ;
we obtain the claimed result with a simple calculation.
We close this section by considering the implications of Theorem 1 to the special cases men-
tioned in the introduction.
10Example 5 (MULTI-ARMED BANDIT PROBLEM.) Recall that in the case of the multi-armed
bandit problem H = L and the condition of the theorem is trivially satisﬁed. Indeed, one may
take K to be the identity matrix so that k = 1. Thus, Theorem 1 implies a bound of the order
of ((N2 lnN)=n)1=3. Even though, as it is shown in the next section, the rate O(n 1=3) cannot
be improved in general, faster rates of convergence are achievable for the special case of the
bandit problem. Indeed, for the bandit problem Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, and Schapire [2]
and Auer [1] describe careful modiﬁcationsof the forecaster of Theorem 1 that achieves an upper
bound of the order of
p
N ln(Nn)=n. It remains a challenging problem to characterize the class
of problems that admit rates of convergence faster than O(n 1=3).
Example 6 (DYNAMIC PRICING.) In the discretized version of the dynamic pricing problem
(i.e., when all prices are restricted to the set f0;1=N;:::;(N   1)=Ng), the feedback matrix is
given by h(i;j) = aIij + bIi>j for some arbitrarily chosen values of a and b. By choosing, for
example, a = 1 and b = 0, it is clear that H is an invertible matrix and therefore one may choose
K = LH 1 and obtain a Hannan-consistent strategy with average regret of the order of n 1=3.
Thus, the seller has a way of selecting the prices It such that his loss is not much larger than what
he could have achieved had he known the values yt of all costumers and offered the best constant
price. Note that with this choice of a and b, the value of k equals 1 (i.e., does not depend on N)
and therefore the upper bound has the form C((N2 logN)=n)1=3p
ln(1=) for some constant C.
By choosing N  n1=5 and running the forecaster into stages of doubling lengths the effect of
discretization decreases at about the same rate as the average regret, and for the original problem
with unrestricted price range one may obtain a regret bound of the form
1
n
n X
t=1
`(pt;yt)   min
q2[0;1]
1
n
n X
t=1
`(q;yt) = O(n
 1=5 lnn) :
Example 7 (APPLE TASTING.) In the apple tasting problem described above, one may choose
the feedback values a = b = 1 and c = 0. Then, the feedback matrix is invertible and, once
again, Theorem 1 applies.
Example 8 (LABEL-EFFICIENT PREDICTION.) Recall next the variant of the label-efﬁcient pre-
diction problem described in the previous section. Here the rank of L equals two, so it is neces-
sary (and sufﬁcient) to encode the feedback matrix such that its rank equals two. One possibility
is to choose a = 1=2, b = 1, and c = 1=4. Then we have L = KH for
K =
2
4
0 2 2
2  2  2
 2 4 4
3
5 :
Theobtainedrateof convergenceO(n 1=3)maybeshowntobe optimal. Infact, itisthisexample
that we use in Section 5 to show that this rate of convergence cannot be improved in general.
Remark 1 It is interesting to point out that the bound of Theorem 1 does not depend explicitly
on the value of the cardinality M of the set of outcomes. Of course, in some problems the value
11k may depend on M. However, in some important special cases, such as the multi-armed bandit
problem for which k = 1, this value is independent of M. In such cases the result extends easily
to inﬁnite set of outcomes. In particular, the case when the loss matrix may change with time can
be encoded this way.
4 Other regret-minimizing strategies
In the previous section we saw a forecasting strategy that guarantees that the average regret is
of the order of n 1=3 whenever the loss matrix L can be expressed as KH for some matrix
K. In this section we discuss some alternative strategies that yield small regret under different
conditions.
First note that it is not true that the existence of a Hannan consistent predictor is guaranteed
if and only the loss matrix L can be expressed as KH. The following example describes such a
situation.
Example 9 Let N = M = 3 and
L =
2
4
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
3
5 and H =
2
4
a b c
d d d
e e e
3
5 :
Clearly, for all choices of the numbers a;b;c;d;e, the rank of the feedback matrix is at most two
and therefore there is no matrix K for which L = KH. However, note that whenever the ﬁrst
action is played, the forecaster has full information about the outcome yt. Formally, an action
i 2 f1;:::;Ng is said to be revealing for a feedback matrix L if all entries in the i-th row of
L are different. Below we prove existence of a Hannan consistent forecaster for all problems in
which there exists a revealing action.
Theorem 2 Consider an arbitrary partial monitoring problem (L;H) such that L has a re-
vealing action. Let  2 (0;1). If the randomized forecasting strategy of Figure 2 is run with
parameters
" = max
(
0;
m  
p
2mln(4=)
n
)
and  =
r
2"lnN
n
where m = (4n)2=3(ln(4N=))1=3, then
1
n
 
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min
i=1;:::;N
L1;n
!
 8n
 1=3

ln
4N

1=3
holds with probability at least 1    for any strategy of the opponent.
12Parameters: 0  "  1 and  > 0. Action r is revealing.
Initialization: w1;0 =  = wN;0 = 1.
For each round t = 1;2;:::
(1) draw an action Jt from f1;:::;Ng according to the distribution
pi;t =
wi;t 1
PN
j=1 wj;t 1
; i = 1;:::;N ;
(2) draw a Bernoulli random variable Zt such that P[Zt = 1] = ";
(3) if Zt = 1 then play a revealing action, It = r, observe yt, and compute
wi;t = wi;t 1e
  `(i;yt)=" for each i = 1;:::;N ;
(4) otherwise, if Zt = 0, play It = Jt and let wi;t = wi;t i for each i = 1;:::;N.
Figure 2: The randomized forecaster for feedback matrices with a revealing action.
Proof. The forecaster of Figure 2 chooses at each round a revealing action with a small proba-
bility "  m=n (of the order of n 1=3). At these m stages where a revealing action is chosen, the
forecaster suffers a total loss of about m = O(n2=3) but gets full information about the outcome
yt. This situation is a modiﬁcation of the problem of label efﬁcient prediction studied in Helm-
bold and Panizza [24], and in Cesa-Bianchi, Lugosi, and Stoltz [11]. In particular, the algorithm
proposed in Figure 2 coincides with that of of Theorem 2 of [11] –except maybe at those rounds
when Zt = 1. Indeed, Theorem 2 of [11] ensures that, with probability at least 1   , not more
than m among the Zt have value 1, and that
n X
t=1
`(Jt;yt)   min
j=1;:::;N
n X
t=1
`(j;yt) 6 8n
r
ln(4N=)
m
:
This in turn implies that
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min
j=1;:::;N
n X
t=1
`(j;yt) 6 m + 8n
r
ln(4N=)
m
;
and substituting the proposed value for the parameter m concludes the proof.
Remark 2 (DEPENDENCE ON N.) Observe that, even when the condition of Theorem 1 is
satisﬁed, the bound of Theorem 2 is considerably tighter. Indeed, even though the dependence
on the time horizon n is identical in both bounds (of the order of n 1=3), the bound of Theorem 2
depends on the number of actions N in a logarithmic way only. As an example, consider the case
13of the multi-armed bandit problem. Recall that here H = L and there is a revealing action if
and only if the loss matrix has a row whose elements are all different. In such a case Theorem 2
provides a bound of the order of ((lnN)=n)1=3. On the other hand, there exist bandit problems
for which, if N  n, it is impossible to achieve a regret smaller than (1=20)(N=n)1=2 (see [2]).
If N is large, the logarithmic dependence of Theorem 2 gives a considerable advantage.
Interestingly, even if L cannot be expressed as KH, if a revealing action exists, the strategy of
Section 3 may be used to achieve a small regret. This may be done by using a trick of Piccolboni
and Schindelhauer [33] to ﬁrst convert the problem into another partial-monitoring problem for
which the strategy of Section 3 can be used. The basic step of this conversion is to replace the
pair of N  M matrices (L;H) by a pair of mN  M matrices (L0;H0) where m  M denotes
the cardinality of the set S = fs1;:::;smg of signals (i.e., the number of distinct elements of
the matrix H). In the obtained prediction problem the forecaster chooses among mN actions at
each time instance. The converted loss matrix L0 is obtained simply by repeating each row of the
original loss matrix m times. The new feedback matrix H0 is binary and is deﬁned by
H
0(m(i   1) + k;j) = Ih(i;j)=sk ; i = 1;:::;N; k = 1;:::;m; j = 1;:::;M :
Note that this way we get rid of the inconvenient problem of how to encode in a natural way the
feedback symbols. If the matrices
H
0 and

H0
L0

have the same rank, then there exists a matrix K0 such that L0 = K0 H0 and the forecaster of
Section 3 may be applied to obtain a forecaster that has an average regret of the order of n 1=3
for the converted problem. However, it is easy to see that any forecaster A with such a bounded
regret for the converted problem may be trivially transformed into a forecaster A0 for the original
problem with the same regret bound: A0 simply takes an action i whenever A takes an action of
the form m(i   1) + k for any k = 1;:::;m.
The above conversion procedure guarantees Hannan consistency for a large class of partial
monitoring problems. For example, if the original problem has a revealing action i, then m = M
and the M M sub-matrix formed by the rows M(i 1)+1;:::;Mi of H0 is the identity matrix
(up to some permutations over the rows), and therefore has full rank. Then obviously a matrix
K0 with the desired property exists and the procedure described above leads to a forecaster with
an average regret of the order of n 1=3.
This last statement may be generalized in a straightforward way to an even larger class of
problems as follows.
Corollary 1 (DISTINGUISHING ACTIONS.) Assume that the feedback matrix H is such that for
each outcome j = 1;:::;M there exists an action i 2 f1;:::;Ng such that for all outcomes
j0 6= j, h(i;j) 6= h(i;j0). Then the conversion procedure described above leads to a Hannan
consistent forecaster with an average regret of the order of n 1=3.
14The rank of H0 may be considered as a measure of the information provided by the feedback.
The highest possible value is achieved by matrices H0 with rank M. For such feedback matrices,
Hannan consistency may be achieved for all associated loss matrices L0.
Even though the above conversion strategy applies to a large class of problems, the associ-
ated condition fails to characterize the set of pairs (L;H) for which a Hannan consistent fore-
caster exists. Indeed, Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [33] show a second simple conversion of
the pair (L0;H0) that can be applied in situations when there is no matrix K0 with the prop-
erty L0 = K0 L0 (this second conversion basically deals with some actions which they deﬁne
as “useless”). In these situations a Hannan consistent procedure may be constructed based on
the forecaster of Section 3. On the other hand, Piccolboni and Schindelhauer also show that if
the condition of Theorem 1 is not satisﬁed after the second step of conversion, then there exists
an external randomization over the sequences of outcomes such that the sequence of expected
regrets grows at least as n, where the expectations are understood with respect to the forecaster’s
auxiliary randomization and the external randomization. Thus, a proof by contradiction using
the dominated-convergence theorem shows that Hannan consistency is impossible to achieve in
these cases. This result combined with Theorem 1 implies the following gap theorem.
Corollary 2 Consider a partial monitoringforecasting problem with loss and feedback matrices
L and H. If Hannan consistency can be achieved for this problem, then there exists a Hannan
consistent forecaster whose average regret vanishes at rate n 1=3.
Thus, whenever it is possible to force the average regret to converge to zero, a convergence
rate of the order of n 1=3 is also possible. In some special cases, such as the multi-armed bandit
problem,evenfaster ratesoftheorderofn 1=2 maybeachieved(see Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund,
and Schapire [2] and Auer [1]). However, as it is shown in Section 5 below, for certain problems
in which Hannan consistency is achievable, it can only be achieved with rate of convergence not
faster than n 1=3.
5 A lower bound on the regret
Next we show that the order of magnitude (in terms of the length of the play n) of the bound of
Theorem 1 is, in general, not improvable. A closely related idea in a somewhat different context
appears in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [32].
Theorem 3 Consider the partial monitoring problem of label-efﬁcient prediction introduced in
Example 4 and deﬁned by the pair of loss and feedback matrices
L =
2
4
1 1
0 1
1 0
3
5 and H =
2
4
a b
c c
c c
3
5 :
Then, for any n > 8 and for any (randomized) forecasting strategy there exists a sequence
y1;:::;yn of outcomes such that
E
"
1
n
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)
#
  min
i=1;:::;N
1
n
n X
t=1
`(i;yt) >
n 1=3
5
;
15where E denotes the expectation with respect to the auxiliary randomization of the forecaster.
Remark 3 Using techniques as in [11], it is easy to extend the theorem above to get lower bound
of the order of n2=3(lnN)1=3. The latter is the best possible general lower bound in view of the
upper bound obtained in Theorem 2. However, we conjecture that in many cases signiﬁcantly
larger lower bounds (as a function of N) hold.
Proof. The proof proceeds by constructing a random sequence of outcomes and showing that,
for any (possibly randomized) forecaster, the expected value of the regret with respect both to
the random choice of the outcome sequence and to the forecaster’s random choices is bounded
from below by the claimed quantity.
More precisely, ﬁx n  8 and denote by U 1;:::;Un the auxiliary randomization which the
forecaster hasaccessto. Withoutlossofgenerality,itcanbetakenasani.i.d.sequenceofuniform
random variables in [0;1]. The underlying probability space is equipped with the -algebra of
events generated by the random sequence of outcomes Y1;:::;Yn and by the randomization
U1;:::;Un. The random sequence of outcomes is independent of the auxiliary randomization,
whose associated probability distribution is denoted by PA.
We deﬁne three different probability distributions, P 
 P A, Q 
 PA, and R 
 PA, formed by
the product of the auxiliary randomization and one of the three probability distributions P, Q,
and R over the sequence of outcomes deﬁned as follows. Under P the sequence Y 1;Y2;:::;Yn
is formed by independent, identically distributed f1;2g-valued random variables with parameter
1=2. Under Q (respectively R) the Yi are also i.i.d. and f1;2g-valued but with parameter 1=2 "
(respectively 1=2 + "), where " > 0 is chosen below.
We denote by EA (respectively, EP, EQ, ER, EP
PA, EQ
PA, ER
PA) the expectation with
respect to PA (respectively, P, Q, R, P 
 PA, Q 
 PA, R 
 PA). Obviously,
sup
yn
1

EA
h
b Ln
i
  min
j=1;2;3
Lj;n

> EP

EA
h
b Ln
i
  min
j=1;2;3
Lj;n

: (3)
Now,
EQ

min
j=1;2;3
Lj;n

6 min
j=1;2;3
EQ [Lj;n] =
n
2
  n" ;
whereas
EQ
h
b Ln
i
=
n
2
+
1
2
EQ [N1] + "EQ [N3]   "EQ [N2] ;
where Nj is the random variable denoting the number of times the forecaster chooses the action
j over the sequence Y1;:::;Yn, given the state U1;:::;Un of the auxiliary randomization, for
j = 1; 2; 3. Thus, using Fubini’s theorem,
EQ

EA
h
b Ln
i
  min
j=1;2;3
Lj;n

>
1
2
EQ
PA [N1] + "(n   EQ
PA [N2]) :
A similar argument shows that
ER

EA
h
b Ln
i
  min
j=1;2;3
Lj;n

>
1
2
ER
PA [N1] + "(n   ER
PA [N3]) :
16Averaging the two inequalities we get
EP

EA
h
b Ln
i
  min
j=1;2;3
Lj;n

>
1
2
EP
PA [N1] + "

n  
1
2
(EQ
PA [N2] + ER
PA [N3])

: (4)
Consider ﬁrst a deterministic forecaster. Denote by T 1;:::;TN1 2 f1;:::;ng the times when the
forecaster chose action 1. Since action 1 is revealing, we know the outcomes at these times, and
denote them by Zn+1 = (YT1;:::;YTN1). Denote by Kt the (random) index of the largest integer
j such that Tj 6 t   1. Each action It of the forecaster is determined by the random vector (of
random length) Zt =
 
Y1;:::;YTKt

. Since the forecaster we consider is deterministic, Kt is
fully determined by Zn+1. Hence, It may be seen as a function of Zn+1 rather than a function
of Zt only. This implies that, denoting by Pn (respectively Qn) the distribution of Zn+1 under
P (respectively Q), we have Q[It = 2] = Qn [It = 2] and P[It = 2] = Pn [It = 2]. Pinsker’s
inequality (see, e.g., [12, Lemma 12.6.1]) then ensures that, for all t,
Q[It = 2] 6 P[It = 2] +
r
1
2
K(Pn;Qn) ; (5)
where K denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence. The right-hand side may be further bounded
using the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Consider a deterministic forecaster. For 0 6 " 6 1=
p
6,
K(Pn;Qn) 6 6EP [N1]"
2 :
Proof. We note that Zn+1 = Zn, except when In = 1. In this case, Zn+1 = (Zn;Yn). Therefore,
using the chain rule for relative entropy (see, e.g., [12, Lemma 2.5.3]),
K(Pn;Qn) 6 K(Pn 1;Qn 1) + P[In = 1]K
 
B1=2;B1=2 "

6 K(Pn 1;Qn 1) + P[In = 1]
2"2
1   4"2 ;
where Bp denotes the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p. We conclude by iterating the
argument and using that 1   4"2 > 1=3 for 0 6 " 6 1=
p
6.
Summing (5) over t = 1;:::;n, we have proved that
EQ [N2] 6 EP [N2] + n"
p
3EP [N1] ;
and this holds for any deterministic strategy. (Note that considering a deterministic strategy
amounts to conditioning on the auxiliary randomization U1;:::;Un.)
Consider now an arbitrary (possibly randomized) forecaster. Using Fubini’s theorem and
Jensen’s inequality, we get
EQ
PA [N2] 6 EP
PA [N2] + n"
p
3EP
PA [N1] : (6)
17Symmetrically,
ER
PA [N3] 6 EP
PA [N3] + n"
p
3EP
PA [N1] : (7)
Using EP
PA [N2] + EP
PA [N3] 6 n, and plugging (6) and (7) into (4) yield
EP

EA
h
b Ln
i
  min
j=1;2;3
Lj;n

> m0 + n"

1
2
  "
p
3m0

; (8)
where m0 denotes EP
PA [N1]. If m0 6 1=8 then for " = 1=
p
6 the right-hand side of (8)
is at least n=10, which is greater than n2=3=5 for n > 8. Otherwise, if m0 > 1=8, we set
" =
 
4
p
3m0
 1, which still satisﬁes 0 6 " 6 1=
p
6. The lower bound then becomes
EP

EA
h
b Ln
i
  min
j=1;2;3
Lj;n

> m0 +
n
16
p
3m0
and the right-hand side may be seen to be always bigger than n2=3=5. An application of (3)
concludes the proof.
6 Internal regret
In this section we treat the stronger notion of internal (or conditional) regret. Internal regret
is concerned with consistent modiﬁcations of the forecasting strategy. Each of these possible
modiﬁcations is parameterized by a departure function  : f1;:::;Ng ! f1;:::;Ng. After
round n, the cumulative loss of the forecaster is compared to the cumulative loss that would
have been accumulated had the forecaster chosen action (It) instead of action It at round t,
t = 1;:::;n. If such a consistent modiﬁcation does not result in a much smaller accumulated
loss then the strategy is said to have small internal regret. Formally, we seek strategies such that
minimize the average internal regret achieving
1
n
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)  
1
n
min

n X
t=1
`((It);yt) = o(1)
where the minimization is over all possible functions . We can extend the notion of Hannan
consistency to internal regret by requiring that the above average regret vanishes with probability
1 as n ! 1.
The notion of internal regret has been shown to be useful in the theory of equilibria of re-
peated games. Foster and Vohra [15, 17] showed that if all players of a ﬁnite game choose a
strategy that is Hannan consistent with respect to the internal regret, then the joint empirical fre-
quencies of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game (see also Fudenberg and
Levine [18], Hart and Mas-Collel [21]). Foster and Vohra [15, 17] proposed internal regret mini-
mizingstrategiesfor the full-informationcase, see also Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi[10]. We design
here such a procedure in the setting of partial monitoring. The key tool is a conversion trick de-
scribed in Stoltz and Lugosi [35] (see also Blum and Mansour [7], for a related procedure). This
18trick essentially converts external regret minimizing strategies into internal regret minimizing
strategies, under full information. We extend it here to prediction under partial monitoring.
The forecaster we propose is formed by a sub-algorithm and a master algorithm. The param-
eters t and t used below are tuned as in Section 3. At each round t the sub-algorithm outputs a
probability distribution
ut =
 
u
i!j
t

(i;j):i6=j
over the set of pairs of different actions; with the help of ut the master algorithm computes a
probability distribution pt over the actions.
Consider the loss estimates e `(i;yt) deﬁned in (1). For a given distributionp over f1;:::;Ng,
denote
e `(p;y) =
N X
k=1
pk e `(k;y) :
Now introduce the cumulative losses
e L
i!j
t 1 =
t 1 X
s=1
e `(p
i!j
s ;ys)
where pi!j
s denotes the probability distributionobtained from ps by movingthe probability mass
pi;s from i to j; that is, we set p
i!j
s;i = 0 and p
i!j
s;j = ps;j + ps;i. The distribution ut computed by
the sub-algorithm is an exponentially weighted average associated to the cumulative losses e L
i!j
t 1,
that is,
u
i!j
t =
exp

 te L
i!j
t 1

P
k6=l exp

 te Lk!l
t 1
 :
Now let e pt be the probability distribution over the set of actions deﬁned by the equation
X
(i;j):i6=j
u
i!j
t e p
i!j
t = e pt : (9)
Such a distributionexists, andcan be computedbya simpleGaussianelimination(see e.g., Foster
and Vohra [17], or Stoltz and Lugosi [35]). The master algorithm then chooses, at round t, the
action It drawn according to the probability distribution
pt = (1   t)e pt +
t
N
1 (10)
where 1 = (1;:::;1).
Theorem 4 Consider any partial monitoring problem such that the loss and feedback matrices
satisfy L = KH for some N  N matrix K with k = maxf1; maxi;j jk(i;j)jg, and consider
19the forecaster decribed above. Let  2 (0;1). Then, for all n, with probability at least 1   , the
cumulative internal regret is bounded as
1
n
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min

1
n
n X
t=1
`((It);yt)
 9

(k)2N5 lnN
n
1=3  
1 +
r
3
2
ln(2N2)=)
lnN
!
+N
r
1
2n
ln
2N2

+ 4(k
N)
4=3n
 2=3(lnN)
 1=3 ln
2N2

+
kN
n
ln
2N2

where the minimum is taken over all functions  : f1;:::;Ng ! f1;:::;Ng.
Note that with the help of Borel-Cantelli lemma, Theorem 4 shows that, under the same con-
ditions on L and H, the forecaster decribed above achieves Hannan consistency with respect to
internal regret.
Proof. First observe that it sufﬁces to consider departure functions  that differ from the identity
function in only one point of their domain. This follows simply from
n X
t=1
`(It;yt)   min

n X
t=1
`((It);yt) 6 N
 
max
i6=j
n X
t=1
IIt=i (`(i;yt)   `(j;yt))
!
:
We now bound the right-hand side of the latter inequality.
For a given t, the estimated losses e `(p
i!j
t ;yt), i 6= j, fall in the interval [0; kN=t]. Since t
and t are tuned as in Theorem 1, kNt=t 6 1, and we may apply Theorem 5 to derive
n X
t=1
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t e `(p
i!j
t ;yt)   min
i6=j
n X
t=1
e `(p
i!j
t ;yt)
6
2lnN(N   1)
n+1
+
n X
t=1
t
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t

e `(p
i!j
t ;yt)
2
: (11)
For i 6= j, 1i!j is the vector v such that vi = 0, vj = 2, and vk = 1 for all k 6= i and k 6= j. Use
ﬁrst (10) and then (9) to rewrite the ﬁrst term of the left-hand side of (11) as
n X
t=1
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t e `(p
i!j
t ;yt) =
n X
t=1
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t

(1   t)e `(e p
i!j
t ;yt) +
t
N
e `(1
i!j;yt)

=
n X
t=1
(1   t)e `(e pt;yt) +
n X
t=1
t
N
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t e `(1
i!j;yt)
=
n X
t=1
e `(pt;yt) +
n X
t=1
t
N
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t

e `(1
i!j;yt)   e `(1;yt)

=
n X
t=1
e `(pt;yt) +
n X
t=1
t
N
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t

e `(j;yt)   e `(i;yt)

:
20Plugging back into (11), we have
max
i6=j
n X
t=1
pi;t

e `(i;yt)   e `(j;yt)

=
n X
t=1
e `(pt;yt)   min
i6=j
n X
t=1
e `(p
i!j
t ;yt) (12)
6
4lnN
n+1
+
n X
t=1
t
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t

e `(p
i!j
t ;yt)
2
+
n X
t=1
t
N
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t

e `(i;yt)   e `(j;yt)

:
Now, we apply Bernstein’s inequality (Lemma 7) several times again. We mimic the proofs of
Lemmas1and 2toshowthat, for everypair i 6= j, withprobabilityat least1 =(2N(N 1)+2),
n X
t=1
pi;t

e `(i;yt)   e `(j;yt)

>
n X
t=1
pi;t (`(i;yt)   `(j;yt))
 
0
@
v u
u
t4(kN)2
 
n X
t=1
1
t
!
ln
2N(N   1) + 2

+
p
2
3
kN
n
ln
2N(N   1) + 2

1
A : (13)
Similarly to Lemma 3, we also have, with probability at least 1   =(2N(N   1) + 2),
n X
t=1
t
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t

e `(p
i!j
t ;yt)
2

n X
t=1
t
(kN)2
t
+
v u
u
t2(kN)4
 
n X
t=1
2
t
3
t
!
ln
2N(N   1) + 2

+
p
2
3
ln
2N(N   1) + 2

(14)
whereas, similarly to Lemma 4, with probability at least 1   =(2N(N   1) + 2),
n X
t=1
t
N
X
i6=j
u
i!j
t

e `(i;yt)   e `(j;yt)


1
N
n X
t=1
t
+
v u
u t4(k)2
 
n X
t=1
t
!
ln
2N(N   1) + 2

+
p
2k
3
ln
2N(N   1) + 2

: (15)
We then use Hoeffding-Azuma inequality N(N  1) times to show that for every pair i 6= j, with
probability at least 1   =(2N(N   1) + 2),
n X
t=1
pi;t (`(i;yt)   `(j;yt)) 
n X
t=1
IIt=i (`(i;yt)   `(j;yt))  
r
2nln
N(N   1) + 3

: (16)
21Finally, we plug inequalities (13)–(16) into (12) and use a union-of-event bound to obtain that,
with probability at least 1   ,
max
i6=j
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0 ;
where we used the notation 0 = =(2N(N   1) + 2). The proof is now concluded as that of
Theorem 1.
7 Random feedback
Several authors consider an extended setup in which the feedbacks are random variables. See
Rustichini [34], Mannor and Shimkin [29], Weissman and Merhav [38], Weissman, Merhav and
Somekh-Baruch [39] for examples. In this section we brieﬂy point out that most of the results of
this paper extend effortlessly to this more general case.
To describe the model, denote by (S) the set of all probability distributions over the set
of signals S. The signaling structure is formed by a collection of NM probability distributions
(i;j) over S, for i = 1;:::;N and j = 1;:::;M. At each round, the forecaster now observes
a random variable H(It;yt), drawn independently from all the other random variables, with
distribution (It;yt).
We may easily generalize the results of Theorems 1 and 4 to the case of random feedbacks.
As above, each element of S is encoded by a real number in [ 1;1]. Let E be the N M matrix
whose elements are given by the expectations of the random variables H(i;j). Theorems 1 and 4
remain true under the condition that there exists a matrix K such that L = KE. The only
necessary modiﬁcation is how the losses are estimated. Here the forecaster uses the estimates
 `(i;yt) =
k(i;It)H(It;yt)
pIt;t
i = 1;:::;N
22instead of the estimates deﬁned in Section 3. Conditioned on I 1;:::;It 1, the expectation of
 `(i;yt)istheloss`(i;yt). Sincethis, togetherwithboundedness,are the onlyconditionsthatwere
needed in the proofs, the extension of the results to this more general framework is immediate.
The results of Section 4 may be generalized to the case of random feedbacks as well. For
example, to construct H0 when H is a matrix of probability distributions over S, we proceed as
follows: for 1 6 i 6 N and s 2 S, denote by H(i;s) the row vector of elements in [0;1], such
that the k-th element of H(i;s) is (i;k)(s). Now, the ((k1  1)m+k2)-th row of H0, 1 6 k1 6 N,
1 6 k2 6 m, is H(k1;sk2). All the other details of the construction and the proofs go through.
Appendix: Bernstein’s inequality
Bernstein’s inequality (see, e.g. [14]) is used several times in the proofs.
Lemma 7 (Bernstein’s inequality) Let X1;X2;:::;Xn be a bounded martingale difference se-
quence (with respect to the ﬁltration F = (Ft)16t6n)), with increments bounded in absolute
values by K, and
Mn =
n X
t=1
Xt
the associated martingale. Denote its predictable quadratic variation by
Vn =
n X
t=1
E

X
2
t jFt 1

and assume that Vn 6 v for some constant v. Then, for all u > 0,
P[Mn > u] 6 exp

 
u2
2(v + Ku=3)

and in particular, for all x > 0,
P
h
Mn >
p
2vx + (
p
2=3)Kx
i
6 e
 x :
Appendix: basic lemmas
Theorem 5 Consider any sequence of losses `i;t 2 [0;Bt], i = 1;:::;N, Bt > 0, t = 1;:::;n,
and any non-increasing sequence of tuning parameters t > 0, t = 1;:::;n, such that tBt 6 1
for all t. Then, the forecaster which uses the exponentially weighted averages
qi;t =
wi;t
PN
j=1 wj;t
; i = 1;:::;N;
where
wi;t = exp
 
 t
t 1 X
s=1
`i;s
!
;
23satisﬁes
n X
t=1
N X
i=1
qi;t`i;t   min
j=1;:::;N
n X
t=1
`j;t 6

2
n+1
 
1
1

lnN +
n X
t=1
t
N X
i=1
qi;t `
2
i;t :
The proof below is a simple modiﬁcation of an argument ﬁrst proposed in [3]. Denote the
numerator of the deﬁning expression of q i;t by wi;t = e tLi;t 1, where Li;t 1 = `i;1+:::+`i;t 1,
and use w0
i;t = e t 1Li;t 1 to denote the weight wi;t where the parameter t is replaced by t 1.
The normalization factors will be denoted by Wt =
PN
j=1 wj;t and W 0
t =
PN
j=1 w0
j;t. Finally, we
use kt to denote the expert whose loss after the ﬁrst t rounds is the lowest (ties are broken by
choosing the expert with smallest index). That is, Lkt;t = miniN Li;t.
In the proof of the theorem, we also make use of the following technical lemma.
Lemma 8 For all N  2, for all     0, and for all d1;:::;dN  0 such that
PN
i=1 e di 
1,
ln
PN
i=1 e di
PN
j=1 e dj

   

lnN :
Proof. We begin by writing
ln
PN
i=1 e di
PN
j=1 e dj
= ln
PN
i=1 e di
PN
j=1 e( )dje dj
=  lnE

e
( )D
 (   )E [D]
where we applied Jensen inequality to the random variable D taking value di with probability
e di=
PN
j=1 e dj for each j = 1;:::;N. Since D takes at most N distinct values, its entropy
H(D) is at most lnN. Therefore
lnN  H(D) =
PN
i=1 e di
PN
j=1 e dj
 
di + ln
N X
j=1
e
 dj
!
= E [D] + ln
N X
j=1
e
 dj  E [D]
where the last inequality holds since
PN
i=1 e di  1. Hence E [D]  (lnN)=. As  >  by
hypothesis, we can plug the bound on E [D] in the upper bound above and conclude the proof.
Proof. As it is usual in the analysis of the exponentially weighted average predictor, we study the
evolution of ln(Wt+1=Wt). However, here we need to couple this term with ln(wkt 1;t=wkt;t+1)
including in both terms the time-varying parameter t. Tracking the currently best expert kt is
used to lower bound the weight ln(wkt;t+1=Wt+1). In fact, the weight of the overall best expert
24(after n rounds) could get arbitrarily small during the prediction process. We thus obtain the
following
1
t
ln
wkt 1;t
Wt
 
1
t+1
ln
wkt;t+1
Wt+1
=

1
t+1
 
1
t

ln
Wt+1
wkt;t+1
+
1
t
ln
w0
kt;t+1=W 0
t+1
wkt;t+1=Wt+1
+
1
t
ln
wkt 1;t=Wt
w0
kt;t+1=W 0
t+1
= (A) + (B) + (C) :
We now bound separately the three terms on the right-hand side. The term (A) is easily bounded
by using t+1 6 t and using the fact that kt is the index of the expert with smallest loss after the
ﬁrst t rounds. Therefore, w kt;t+1=Wt+1 must be at least 1=N. Thus we have
(A) =

1
t+1
 
1
t

ln
Wt+1
wkt;t+1


1
t+1
 
1
t

lnN :
We proceed to bounding the term (B) as follows
(B) =
1
t
ln
w0
kt;t+1=W 0
t+1
wkt;t+1=Wt+1
=
1
t
ln
PN
i=1 e
 t+1(Li;t Lkt+1;t)
PN
j=1 e
 t(Lj;t Lkt+1;t)

t   t+1
tt+1
lnN =

1
t+1
 
1
t

lnN
where the inequality is proven by applying Lemma 8 with di = Li;t   Lkt+1;t. Note that di  0
since kt is the index of the expert with smallest loss after the ﬁrst t rounds and
PN
i=1 e t+1di  1
as for i = kt+1 we have di = 0. The term (C) is ﬁrst split as follows
(C) =
1
t
ln
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w0
kt;t+1=W 0
t+1
=
1
t
ln
wkt 1;t
w0
kt;t+1
+
1
t
ln
W 0
t+1
Wt
:
We bound separately each one of the two terms on the right-hand side. For the ﬁrst one, we have
1
t
ln
wkt 1;t
w0
kt;t+1
=
1
t
ln
e
 tLkt 1;t 1
e tLkt;t = Lkt;t   Lkt 1;t 1 :
For the second term, we consider the random variable Zt that takes value `i;t with probability
qi;t = wi;t=Wt for each i = 1;:::;N. As tBt 6 1, we have in particular t`i;t 6 1, so we may
use the inequality ex 6 1 + x + x2 for x 6 1, and ln(1 + u) 6 u for u >  1, to obtain
1
t
ln
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t+1
Wt
=
1
t
ln
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i=1 wi;te t`i;t
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=
1
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N X
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2
i;t :
25Finally, we plug back in the main equation the bounds on the ﬁrst two terms (A) and (B), and
the bounds on the two parts of the term (C). After rearranging we obtain
N X
i=1
qi;t`i;t 
 
Lkt;t   Lkt 1;t 1

+ t
N X
i=1
qi;t`
2
i;t
 
1
t+1
ln
wkt;t+1
Wt+1
+
1
t
ln
wkt 1;t
Wt
+ 2

1
t+1
 
1
t

lnN :
We apply the above inequalities to each t = 1;:::;n and sum up using
n X
t=1
 
Lkt;t   Lkt 1;t 1

= min
j=1;:::;N
Lj;n ;
n X
t=1

 
1
t+1
ln
wkt;t+1
Wt+1
+
1
t
ln
wkt 1;t
Wt

  
1
1
ln
wk0;1
W1
=
lnN
1
to conclude the proof.
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